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I. INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2009, I sent Fred Zacharias an e-mail to let him know 
that the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, on which I was serving, was 
working on an opinion on prosecutorial ethics and to suggest that once it
was published, the opinion might be fodder for our next article.  Over the
preceding decade, Fred and I had coauthored five articles on the regulation
of prosecutors,1 and various others on the regulation of lawyers in general,2 
* Louis Stein Professor of Law and Director, Louis Stein Center for Law and 
Ethics, Fordham University School of Law. 
1. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS. 
L. REV. 837; Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ 















   
    
   
  
   
 














but at that time, we had no work in progress and had been out of touch 
for a while.  It was time to pick up a summer project.
The subject of the ABA committee’s inquiry in what later became 
Opinion 09-454 was the model ethics rule on prosecutors’ disclosure
obligations.3  The rule calls upon a prosecutor to “make timely disclosure to
the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused.”4  The rule goes back four 
decades.  The ABA first adopted it in 1969 as Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-
103(B) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and then
carried it over into Rule 3.8(d) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct  (ABA Model Rules).5  But this would be the committee’s first
opinion addressing this rule and it would help fill a void.  Although most
state courts have incorporated the rule or a variation of it into their ethics 
codes, few state bar association ethics committees or courts had previously
interpreted the rule’s state counterparts.6 
Around the same time that the opinion was underway, prosecutors and
their disclosure obligations were in the news largely because of several
high profile cases in which prosecutors had been embarrassed by 
Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics]; Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys 
Scandal” and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008); Fred 
C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty To Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought
Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter
Zacharias & Green, The Duty To Avoid Wrongful Convictions]; Fred C. Zacharias &
Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000) 
[hereinafter Zacharias & Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors].
2. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional 
Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265 (2006); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Federal 
Court Authority To Regulate Lawyers: A Practice in Search of a Theory, 56 VAND. L. 
REV. 1303 (2003) [hereinafter Zacharias & Green, Federal Court Authority To Regulate 
Lawyers]; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of 
Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2009) [hereinafter Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing 
Judicial Regulation]; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy
Ethics, 74 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Zacharias & Green, Reconceptualizing 
Advocacy Ethics];.
3. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009)
[hereinafter ABA Opinion 09-454], available at http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/ 
200909/opinion_09-454.pdf. 
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 3.8(d) (2010), available at http://www. 
abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_3_8.html. 
5. ABA Model Rule 3.8(d) provides in full:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: . . . (d) make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with
sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is 
relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal. 
Id.
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discovery failures.7  Various segments of the legal profession were studying
these obligations, whether prosecutors adequately complied with them,
and whether the law should be changed.  Much attention was directed to
prosecutors’ constitutional duty under Brady v. Maryland8 and the decisions 
that followed it, and there was also discussion about expanding federal 
and state statutes governing prosecutors’ disclosure of evidence and 
information to the defense.9  However, participants in the discussion 
largely ignored rule 3.8(d).  They may have been unaware of the rule,
assumed that it added little if anything to constitutional and statutory 
obligations, or believed that any necessary reforms should be achieved 
other than by amending or enforcing the rule. 
It was in response to my e-mail about the forthcoming opinion that I 
first learned from Fred that he had begun medical treatment, having
received, in his words, a “pretty grim” prognosis.  But he was hopeful. 
7. See Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure
Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2161–62 (2010) (describing “a series of federal criminal cases in 
which [the Department of Justice] was embarrassed by its lawyers’ discovery failures”). 
Most notably, the federal prosecution of U.S. Senator Ted Stevens concluded with
Attorney General Holder’s agreement that the district court vacate the jury’s guilty
verdict and dismiss the indictment after a team of Department of Justice lawyers were
found to have withheld information that tended to exculpate the Senator and contradict 
their main witness.  See id.  The U.S. Department of Justice responded by revamping its 
internal policies on disclosure, see id. at 2163, and a committee of the Federal Judicial
Conference, at the urging of the district judge who had presided over Senator Stevens’s 
trial, considered whether to propose changes to the relevant rule of criminal procedure. 
See Letter from Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan to Hon. Richard C. Tallman, Chair, Judicial
Conference Advisory Comm. on the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Apr. 28, 2009), 
available at http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/sullivan_letter.pdf; Letter from
Hon. Richard C. Tallman, Chair, Judicial Conference Advisory Comm. on the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan (July 2, 2009), available at http://
legaltimes.typepad.com/files/tallman_letter.pdf.  Several groups, including the ABA
Criminal Justice Section, cosponsored a two-day conference at Cardozo Law School to
consider what institutional measures should be taken in prosecutors’ offices and elsewhere to
improve prosecutors’ disclosure practices.  See Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady
and Other Disclosure Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1943
(2010). 
8. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (“The prosecution’s 
affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant . . . is of course most 
prominently associated with this Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland.”).
9. See, e.g., Stephen R. Spivack et al., Troubling the Heavens: Production of 
Evidence Favorable to Defendants by the United States, CHAMPION, Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 
24–25; see also supra note 7.
59
  







    
  




    
 
       
 
   
 
   
 
Two weeks later, he sent an e-mail proposing that after the ABA 
published its opinion, we should coauthor not one but three writings in 
response to it.  The first would be a short essay that would “look at the
new ABA opinion,” which Fred had yet to see, “and come to the conclusion 
that while it’s right, . . . each jurisdiction should really look at the rule to
decide if that’s what the jurisdictions want to accomplish.”10 
Fred anticipated that the relationship between rule 3.8(d) and external 
law would be a fundamental question that an opinion interpreting the
rule would have to confront at the start.  Does rule 3.8(d) impose an
obligation that is independent of, and potentially more demanding than,
the disclosure obligations that the Constitution and other law impose on 
prosecutors?  Or does this rule merely authorize state courts to discipline 
prosecutors for knowing violations of their disclosure duties under the 
Constitution and under other law external to the ethics code?  As the 
ABA opinion would note, most of the relevant writings at the time, including 
dicta in two Supreme Court opinions11 and academic commentary,12 
assumed that prosecutors had an independent ethical duty under the rule.
In particular, the writings assumed that unlike Supreme Court decisions 
requiring prosecutors to disclose only evidence and information that is
“material”—meaning significant enough to potentially lead to an
acquittal13—the ethics rule requires disclosure of favorable evidence 
regardless of its relative importance.14  In contrast, several state courts 
10. E-mail from Fred C. Zacharias, Professor of Law, University of San Diego, to 
Bruce A. Green, Professor of Law, Fordham University (Apr. 13, 2009) (on file with
author). 
11. See ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 4 & n.16 (citing Cone v. Bell, 129 
S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009), and Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436).  “Although the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted by Brady, only mandates the 
disclosure of material evidence, the obligation to disclose evidence favorable to the 
defense may arise more broadly under a prosecutor’s ethical or statutory obligations.” 
Id. (quoting Bell, 129 S. Ct. at 1783 n.15).  As the court in Kyles pointed out, Brady
“requires less of the prosecution than” ABA Model Rule 3.8(d).  514 U.S. at 437. 
12. ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 4 n.16 (citing ANNOTATED MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 375 (6th ed. 2007); 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL, THE 
LAW OF LAWYERING § 34.6 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2009) (“This professional ethical duty
is considerably broader than the constitutional duty announced in Brady v. Maryland and 
its progeny . . . .”); PETER A. JOY & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, DO NO WRONG: ETHICS FOR 
PROSECUTORS AND DEFENDERS 145 (2009)); see also ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 
3, at 4 n.12 (citing ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 330 (1979) 
(“[A] disparity exists between the prosecutor’s disclosure duty as a matter of law and the 
prosecutor’s duty as a matter of ethics.”)).
13. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289–90 (1999) (“[Petitioner] must
convince us that ‘there is a reasonable probability’ that the result of the trial would have 
been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense. . . .  [T]he 
question is whether ‘the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole 
case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.’” (quoting Kyles, 
514 U.S. at 435)). 
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had found otherwise,15 disciplinary agencies did not seek to enforce the 
rule based on a liberal interpretation of it, if at all,16 and prosecutors
seemed to treat the ethics rule as an irrelevancy.17 
Fred envisioned that our initial essay on the ABA opinion would draw 
on his recent article, Integrity Ethics,18 which explored the nature of
ethics rules, one of the recurring themes of his extraordinary body of
15. See D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 3.8 cmt. 1 (2007) (“[Rule 3.8] is not 
intended either to restrict or to expand the obligations of prosecutors derived from the 
United States Constitution, federal or District of Columbia statutes, and court rules of 
procedure.”); ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 4 n.18 (“We are aware of only two 
jurisdictions where courts have determined that prosecutors are not subject to discipline
under Rule 3.8(d) for withholding favorable evidence that is not material under the
Brady line of cases.” (citing In re Attorney C, 47 P.3d 1167 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) 
(deferring to the disciplinary board’s finding that the prosecutor did not intentionally
withhold evidence))); see also ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 1 n.2 (citing State 
v. York, 632 P.2d 1261, 1267 (Or. 1981) (Tanzer, J., concurring) (stating that the
predecessor to Rule 3.8(d) “merely codifies Brady v. Maryland”)).
16. See ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 2; see also Richard A. Rosen, 
Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 
N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987) (“[D]espite the universal adoption by the states of
Disciplinary Rules prohibiting prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence and 
falsification of evidence, and despite numerous reported cases showing violations of these 
rules, disciplinary charges have been brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions 
[are] rarely applied.” (footnotes omitted)).  Disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors 
are generally infrequent, and commentators have assumed that disciplinary authorities
are often reluctant to seek sanctions against prosecutors even when there is a basis for 
doing so.  See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time To Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 276–77 (2004); Fred C. Zacharias, The
Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 755 (2001).  In a 2009 article, 
Professor Zacharias and I focused on potential proceedings based on the competence rule
to show, in part, why disciplinary agencies might have this reluctance.  See Zacharias & 
Green, The Duty To Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note 1, at 35–57. 
17. For example, an ethics guide published several years ago by the National 
College of District Attorneys, which calls itself “America’s School for Prosecutors,” 
contains a chapter on prosecutors’ discovery obligations that includes approximately 100 
footnotes citing constitutional case law but makes no mention of the ethics rule.  See L. 
Douglas Pipes, Discovery Danger Zone: The Brady Rule, in  DOING JUSTICE: A 
PROSECUTOR’S GUIDE TO ETHICS AND CIVIL LIABILITY 27, 27–40 (Ronald H. Clark ed., 
2002).  The chapter acknowledges prosecutors’ susceptibility to professional discipline 
for a Brady violation but not for violating the ethics rule per se. See id.; see also Theresa
A. Newman & James E. Coleman Jr., The Prosecutor’s Duty of Disclosure Under ABA 
Model Rule 3.8(d), CHAMPION, Mar. 2010, at 20, 20 (stating that “for years” prior to
ABA Formal Opinion 09-454, the question whether rule 3.8(d) went beyond external law
“had created some confusion and uncertainty among courts, state Bar Associations, and 
even prosecutors”). 

























   
 




writing on the regulation of the bar.19  The article distinguished between 
two types of legal ethics rules—“rules of role” and “rules of integrity”
ethics.20  The former were “professional rules prescrib[ing] functions
that lawyers must fulfill in order to help the legal system achieve its goals,” 
including functions lawyers serve in their roles “as clients’ agents or 
champions, officers of the court, and fair players who ensure that the
adversary game functions as intended.”21  The latter rules “serve as reminders
to lawyers about limits to their roles” and “build upon constraints external
to the ethics codes,” such as ordinary societal standards of morality or 
criminal or civil law.22  The article gave examples of rules that fit into 
each category,23 as well as examples of where it was unclear how to
categorize the rule,24 but the article did not address rule 3.8. 
Fred correctly anticipated that the ABA’s forthcoming opinion would 
conclude that the rule was independent of Brady and other external law, 
and would give guidance about its requirements.25  He wrote that our
essay would “probably” conclude that the ABA was correct.  This would 
mean, in Fred’s classification scheme, that rule 3.8(d) was meant to be a
rule of role.  It did not simply remind prosecutors of existing disclosure
obligations and subject prosecutors to discipline for violating the external 
law.  Rather, the rule reinforced prosecutors’ justice-seeking role,26 
thereby helping the legal system achieve its goals of achieving fair and
accurate outcomes and of affording the accused a fair process in criminal 
19. In her contribution to this collection of articles paying tribute to Professor 
Zacharias, Nancy Moore discusses the significance of his writings on the nature of ethics 
rules, including his article on integrity ethics.  See generally Nancy J. Moore, The
Complexities of Lawyer Ethics Code Drafting: The Contributions of Professor Fred 
Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 335 (2011). 
20. Zacharias, supra note 18, at 546. 
21. Id. at 554. 
22. Id. at 559–60. 
23. See id. at 554–55 & tbl.1 (discussing rules of role); id. at 559–60 & tbl.2 
(discussing integrity rules).
24. See id. at 563–65 (discussing the confidentiality rule); id. at 581 (discussing 
the aggregate settlement rule).
25. See ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 4 (“Unlike Model Rules that 
expressly incorporate a legal standard, Rule 3.8(d) establishes an independent one.”)
footnote omitted)).
26. Both Fred and I wrote about prosecutors’ general duty to “seek justice” and
took different views on the justification for the duty.  He thought the duty was justified
primarily by prosecutors’ power, see Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of 
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 58–60
(1991), while I envisioned it as principally deriving from prosecutors’ role as lawyers for
a sovereignty, see Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 625, 633–37 (1999).  As David Luban notes in his contribution
to this tribute issue, these views are not irreconcilable, and a robust understanding of the
prosecutor’s unique professional status and obligations may build on both perspectives 
and more.  See David Luban, Fred Zacharias’s Skeptical Moralism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. 
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cases.  This conclusion would prevent my having to disavow an ethics
opinion I had a hand in writing; however, we would not be entirely
uncritical.  The essay would consider whether there was still sufficient
justification for an ethics rule that imposed additional disclosure obligations
on prosecutors, assuming that adequate justifications existed forty years 
earlier.  Fred noted: “If the situation has changed since the rule’s adoption, 
then there is all the more reason for states to reconsider what they really 
mean to do.”27 
A short while later, Fred sent me a three-paragraph abstract of the first
piece, as he envisioned it.  He still had not yet seen the ABA opinion, 
and I had not disclosed its details, but true to form, he knew in advance 
that he would take issue with it.  He wrote, referring to the as yet-
unnumbered opinion:
This essay stems from a conversation between two long-time collaborators on
professional responsibility issues after the ABA’s recent issuance of Formal Op.
___.  Both of the authors have written extensively in the fields of prosecutorial
ethics and professional code-drafting.  One author participated in the drafting of 
Formal Op.  The other strongly disagreed with significant aspects of it. 
 Upon reflection, the authors in this essay conclude that the opinion is 
technically correct. It accurately states the ethics rule in question and its originally- 
intended purpose.  It also correctly asserts that states that have adopted the rule
can, and perhaps even should, enforce it.  Yet the authors also conclude that the 
opinion illustrates problems with the rule underlying the opinion and highlights
the importance of code-drafters properly conceptualizing proposed rules when
they frame and adopt them. 
In the short term, this essay should prompt jurisdictions that have adopted
Model Rule 3.8(d) to reconsider how the rule fits other law in the jurisdiction 
and whether they wish to maintain the rule.  The essay is designed for a broader
purpose, however.  It encourages code drafters to focus on the precise character
of particular ethics rules before implementing them.  In the long run, that should
27. E-mail from Fred Zacharias, Professor of Law, University of San Diego, to 
Bruce Green, Professor of Law, Fordham University (Apr. 13, 2009) (on file with 
author).  Fred envisioned the two succeeding articles as more ambitious: The second in
the series would be “an inquiry into whether ‘ethics codes should go beyond the law,’” 
looking not only at rule 3.8—the special rule for prosecutors—but also at such other
provisions as the no-contact rule and the confidentiality rule.  And the last would examine the
question, “If it is legal, is it ethical?” This question, Fred observed, “goes beyond what 
code drafters should do.  In particular, it raises the question of how ethics should be 
arrived at or enforced when neither the substantive law nor professional codes confront a 
moral question.”  E-mail from Fred Zacharias, Professor of Law, University of San 
























help the drafters determine both the wisdom of adopting the rules and the 
appropriate methodology for framing them.28  
Fred followed with a page of thoughts about issues and questions he
expected us to address along the way.
Fred’s correspondence, looking ahead to our next few years of
collaboration at the same time that he was undergoing debilitating 
medical treatment, speaks to many things, including his bravery and 
optimism in the face of his illness, his commitment to a life of the mind, 
and the fertility of his scholarly imagination.  It also speaks to his generosity 
as a friend.  As Fred undoubtedly knew, I cherished our collaboration 
and conversation.  If, as it turned out, I would not get the chance to work
with Fred personally on the contemplated articles, Fred made sure I
would still have a chance to continue engaging with his ideas, as I do in 
writing this essay, and that was a true gift.29 
Fred’s questions about rule 3.8(d) also speak to his acumen, if not 
prescience.  His skepticism about whether state courts should use ethics 
rules to augment prosecutors’ constitutional and statutory disclosure duties 
anticipated an opinion issued by the Ohio Supreme Court in February
2010.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin,30 that court rejected a
grievance board’s recommended punishment of a state prosecutor for 
failing to meet her ethical, if not legal, disclosure obligation.31   A
dissenting justice took the view, consistent with the ABA opinion, that 
Ohio’s counterpart to rule 3.8(d) “differs from the related rule of 
criminal procedure in plain language and purpose” and requires more of
prosecutors.32 In other words, the state’s counterpart to rule 3.8(d)33 was
28. E-mail from Fred Zacharias, Professor of Law, University of San Diego, to 
Bruce Green, Professor of Law, Fordham University (May 29, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
29. So was Fred’s request that I edit one of his last publications.  See Fred C. 
Zacharias, Practice, Theory, and the War on Terror, 59 EMORY L.J. 333, 333 n.* (2009). 
Indeed, Fred invited me to include myself as a coauthor, but the article was too near to 
completion to justify doing so.
30. 124 Ohio St. 3d 415, 2010-Ohio-282, 923 N.E.2d 125. 
31. See id. ¶¶ 2, 16–33. 
32. Id. ¶ 60 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
33. Ohio’s DR 7-103(B) was somewhat differently worded from the ABA model.
It provided: 
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall 
make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if he 
has no counsel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other 
government lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the 
degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. 
OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (1970), available at http://www.
supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/professional/professional.pdf, superseded 
by OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007), available at http://www.supreme





















   
  
  
[VOL. 48:  57, 2011] Prosecutors’ Ethical Duty of Disclosure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
a rule of role.  But the majority rejected this interpretation, finding that 
prosecutors’ disciplinary obligation was no more extensive than their 
legal obligation.34  In Fred’s terminology, this meant that the ethics rule
was an integrity rule.  Fred’s analysis equally anticipated a similar debate
within the California bar, which has divided over whether a proposed
state rule on prosecutorial disclosure should be “circumscribed by the 
constitution, as defined and applied in relevant case law,” or should 
reflect “the broader scope of duty provided in” ABA Model Rule 3.8(d),
as interpreted in Opinion 09-454.35 
Fred and I never had the opportunity to have the further conversations
and collaborations he anticipated.  Although I can imagine some of those 
conversations, I have not set out to write either the essay that Fred had in
mind when he wrote his abstract or the one that we would actually have 
coauthored with the outline as a starting point.  Doing the first would not 
be true to our history of collaboration, and doing the second would be 
impossible because of my own limitations.  Had we been able to continue
our work together, the essay would have evolved over the course of our
conversations, exchange of e-mails, and, eventually, exchange of drafts. 
We would have incorporated new developments and further ideas.  We
would have argued and, as always, found common ground, much as Fred 
might have despaired at some moments of our doing so.  With the benefit
of Fred’s deep knowledge of professional regulation and penetrating and
nuanced approach to it, whatever we ultimately produced would have 
been more interesting and complex than whatever I could write alone. 
The best I can do is to build in my own way on Fred’s outline and in 
doing so, return to, and draw upon, some of the themes of his and our
work. 
differences cannot account for the differences in interpretation between the Ohio
Supreme Court’s opinion and the ABA Opinion. 
34. Kellogg-Martin, 124 Ohio St. 3d 415, ¶¶ 21–22, 923 N.E.2d at 130. 
35. STATE BAR OF CAL., COMM’N FOR THE REVISION OF THE RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE 
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA 78–79 (2010), available at http://calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=WBiabhKgb9s%3d&tabid=2653. 
65
   
 
 
    





















   
II. DIFFERING VISIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE RULES 
Professor Zacharias’s writings often gave advice to ethics rule drafters.36 
One of the points of his article on integrity ethics is that it matters
whether ethics rules are meant to be rules of role or integrity rules, and
that ethics rule drafters should decide in advance which kind of rule they
mean to write.  After a rule is adopted, one’s characterization of a rule may
also influence how one interprets or evaluates it.  The point can be 
illustrated by comparing the ABA ethics opinion and the Ohio Supreme 
Court decision.  They reached essentially opposite conclusions about the 
scope of similar rules on prosecutorial disclosure, driven implicitly by
differing visions of whether the rule was a rule of role or a rule of 
integrity ethics. 
The ABA opinion’s analysis started with the question of whether the 
disclosure rule was bounded by external law37 but did not find this
question particularly thorny.  It noted that the Supreme Court in Brady
and in the cases that followed “established[ed] a constitutional minimum”38 
but did not purport to foreclose courts from “adopting more demanding
disclosure obligations by . . . rule of professional conduct,”39 and that, in
fact, Supreme Court decisions assumed that the ethics rule was more
demanding.40  It stated that “[t]he drafters of Rule 3.8(d), in turn, made
no attempt to codify the evolving constitutional case law.”41  Although
not adopting Professor Zacharias’s terminology, the opinion envisioned 
the ethics obligation as deriving from the prosecutor’s role in the adversary 
process.  The committee cited a comment accompanying rule 3.8 that
indicated that the obligations in that rule generally derived from the 
prosecutor’s “responsibility of a minister of justice . . . to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice, that guilt is decided upon the
basis of sufficient evidence, and that special precautions are taken to
prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent persons.”42  The committee 
36. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes:
Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
223, 281–85 (1993); Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody’s Watching:
Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 
87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 1016–19 (2002). 
37. ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 2 (“A threshold question is whether the
disclosure obligation under Rule 3.8(d) is more extensive than the constitutional
obligation of disclosure.”). 
38. Id. at 3. 
39. Id. 
40. See id. at 4 & n.16. 
41. Id. at 3. 
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identified the disclosure rule in particular as originating out of the 
prosecutor’s role.43  It reasoned: 
A prosecutor’s timely disclosure of evidence and information that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the offense promotes the public
interest in the fair and reliable resolution of criminal prosecutions.  The premise 
of adversarial proceedings is that the truth will emerge when each side presents
the testimony, other evidence and arguments most favorable to its position.  In 
criminal proceedings, where the defense ordinarily has limited access to evidence,
the prosecutor’s disclosure of evidence and information favorable to the defense 
promotes the proper functioning of the adversarial process, thereby reducing the
risk of false convictions.44 
Having established that rule 3.8(d) was not tethered to external law,
the rest of the opinion was given over to interpreting the rule’s 
provisions and applying them to a hypothetical situation.  The committee 
relied on a combination of the rule’s language and its perceived purposes. 
The most significant difference between the ethics rules and the constitutional 
case law, the committee found, is that the case law requires disclosure 
only if evidence or information favorable to the accused is “material,”
whereas the ethics rule “requires the disclosure of evidence or information 
favorable to the defense without regard to the anticipated impact of the
evidence or information on a trial’s outcome.”45  In this respect, the
committee noted, the rule “requires prosecutors to steer clear of the 
constitutional line, erring on the side of caution,” as the U.S. Supreme 
Court has urged prosecutors to do.46  The opinion also addressed when
the necessary disclosures had to be made. Constitutional decisions suggest 
that prosecutors can wait until trial to disclose material information that 
is not exculpatory but that can be used to impeach prosecution witnesses,
and therefore prosecutors need not disclose such information to 
defendants who plead guilty.47  In contrast, the committee found that the 
requirement of “timely disclosure” in rule 3.8(d) meant that favorable 
evidence or information had to be disclosed “as soon as reasonably 
practical” so that defense counsel could make effective use of it in 
advising the defendant, investigating, and preparing for trial.48  Further,
43. See id. 
44. Id. at 3–4. 
45. Id. at 2, 4 (footnote omitted). 
46. Id. at 4 & n.21. 
47. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628–32 (2002), cited in ABA Opinion 
09-454, supra note 3, at 7 n.33.
48. See ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 6. 
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it concluded that “[a] defendant’s consent does not absolve a prosecutor
of the duty imposed by Rule 3.8(d),” as it might absolve a prosecutor of 
the constitutional disclosure duty.49 
Over the dissent of the court’s chief justice, the Ohio Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion about the import of the prosecutorial
disclosure rule in its state ethics code.50  In  Kellogg-Martin, the court 
reviewed the state disciplinary authority’s recommendation that it sanction a
prosecutor, in part, for withholding investigative reports from a defendant 
charged with raping a young girl.  The alleged victim’s age at the time of
the rape was critical to whether the defendant committed the charged
offense of raping a girl younger than thirteen years old or the less serious 
one of raping an older child, and the girl’s testimony about when the 
rapes occurred was critical to establishing the timing.  The prosecutor 
failed to disclose two reports of interviews in which the girl said that the 
rapes occurred at times when she was age thirteen, not twelve.  In the 
court’s view, neither the Constitution nor the relevant Ohio rule of criminal 
procedure required the prosecutor to give the reports to the defense
unless the defendant elected to go to trial because the reports could be
used to impeach the prosecution’s witness but were not exculpatory.51  It
49. Id. at 7. The opinion found that the rule was less demanding than Brady in one 
significant respect: prosecutors had no duty to “undertake an investigation in search of 
exculpatory evidence” because the rule by its terms holds a prosecutor accountable only
when the prosecutor fails to disclose favorable evidence and evidence known to the 
prosecutor.  Id. at 5–6. 
50. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 124 Ohio St. 3d 415, 2010-Ohio-
282, 923 N.E.2d 125, at ¶¶ 21–22.  The prosecution took place in 2002, and therefore the 
prosecutor’s conduct was governed by the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, 
which was superseded by the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, effective February 1,
2007.  See OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (1970), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/professional/professional.
pdf, superseded by OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2007), available at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/profConduct
Rules.pdf.  DR 7-103(B) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, provided: 
A public prosecutor . . . in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to
counsel for the defendant . . . of the existence of evidence, known to the 
prosecutor . . . that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree
of the offense, or reduce the punishment. 
Id.  The now applicable provision of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3.8(d), 
provides: 
    The prosecutor in a criminal case shall not . . . fail to make timely disclosure 
to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with 
sentencing, fail to disclose to the defense all unprivileged mitigating information 
known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this 
responsibility by an order of the tribunal. 
OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2010) (emphasis omitted), available at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/profConduct
Rules.pdf.
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found that the defendant’s guilty plea obviated the disclosure obligation. 
The question, then, was whether DR 7-103(B) required more than the 
Constitution and state procedural rules.  The court held that it did not. 
Its reasoning was brief and seemingly tautological: “[B]road interpretation 
of DR 7-103(B) would threaten prosecutors with professional discipline 
for failing to disclose evidence even when the applicable law does not
require disclosure.  This holding would in effect expand the scope of 
discovery currently required of prosecutors in criminal cases.”52 
One might suppose that the ABA’s ethics committee and the Ohio
Supreme Court employed similar tools of interpretation but reached
different results because interpreting the law is an art, not a science; the
tools used for interpreting ambiguous rules and statutes may generate 
different results in the hands of different judges and lawyers.  This might 
lead one to ask which body, the ABA committee or the Ohio Supreme 
Court, better employed the conventional tools for interpreting rules and
statutes—which one better apprehended the language of the rule, better 
extracted meaning from its drafting history, and better effectuated the
rule’s purpose.  Certainly, the ABA’s approach was better elaborated. 
But interpreting ethics rules is a tricky business.  Little attention has been 
given either to how the ABA ethics committee should interpret model 
ethics rules53 or to how state courts and state and local bar associations’ 
ethics committees should interpret state ethics rules.54  There is no 
broadly accepted answer to these questions, and it is not necessarily the
case that ethics committees and courts should employ the same interpretive
tools in the same manner. 
52. Id. ¶ 21, 923 N.E.2d at 130. 
53. Is the ABA committee supposed to focus on what the original ABA drafters 
intended?  Should it set forth the interpretation that it believes leads to the best results in 
light of contemporaneous legal practices? Should it seek to predict how a court would
interpret the rule and, if so, which court?  For commentary on the role of bar association 
ethics committees, see Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They 
Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 731 n.2 (2002), which cites authorities; and David G. 
Trager, Do Bar Association Ethics Committees Serve the Public or the Profession? An 
Argument for Process Change, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1129 (2006). 
54. For discussion of this question, see Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Federal Grievance 
Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 485 (1989) 
[hereinafter Green, Ethical Rules]. See also Bruce A. Green, Reply, The Market for Bad 
Legal Scholarship: William H. Simon’s Experiment in Professional Regulation, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 1605, 1668 (2008) (“[C]ourts of different jurisdictions can employ
different interpretive approaches; indeed, the court of a single jurisdiction can 




















   
There is another way to understand the division between the ABA 
committee and the Ohio Supreme Court, one that does not turn on the 
different uses of conventional interpretive tools.  It is that the two bodies 
had fundamentally opposing visions of the essential nature of the rule. 
In Professor Zacharias’s terms, the ABA committee thought rule 3.8(d)
is meant to be, or should be, a rule of role, whereas the Ohio Supreme 
Court thought its equivalent prosecutorial disclosure rule is an integrity
rule whose function is to codify the law and no more.  If the Ohio rule’s 
wording is broader than the external law, that is presumably because it
was too broadly written originally or because the external law became 
less demanding after the rule was first written, and the court failed to
revise the rule to correspond with the evolving external law. 
The Ohio Supreme Court made no reference to the ABA opinion and
was certainly free to ignore it.  The ABA ethics committee is a
nonauthoritative body interpreting a model rule drafted by another
nonauthoritative committee of the same organization.  Only state courts, 
not the ABA, have legal ability to adopt, authoritatively interpret, and 
enforce ethics rules for lawyers.  A state court can reject an ABA model
altogether.  Equally, the state high court can adopt the wording of an
ABA model but interpret its rule differently from how the ABA interprets 
the identically worded model. 
The Ohio Supreme Court might have rejected the ABA interpretation 
for various reasons.  It may have had a different understanding when it 
initially adopted the rule.  However, it is unlikely that when state courts
adopted prosecutorial disclosure rules, they initially gave much thought
to the nature or meaning of the rules.  They did not draft the rules 
themselves but generally adopted them as part of a package of provisions
recommended by a bar association.55  Years later, a state court probably 
could not say with confidence whether its original understanding was 
that the rule was independent of Brady or a mere codification.  But a 
court would not be bound by its original understanding in any case.  If at
the time of adoption the state high court thought the prosecutorial
disclosure rule was a rule of role that was more demanding than Brady, 
nothing would prevent the court from reconceptualizing the rule if, upon 
further reflection, it came to a different view.  A state high court need 
not carry out the “intent” of the bar association drafters or its own intent
in adopting an ethics rule as it would be obliged based on separation of
powers principles to effect the legislative intent when interpreting a 
55. State courts generally do not take an active role in rulemaking.  They typically
adopt rules based on bar association recommendations without giving much thought to 
them, and first think hard about a rule when it is time to interpret or apply it. See
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statute.56  The court could interpret its rule dynamically, in light of what 
it now considered to be the best approach to lawyer regulation.  In doing
so, as a matter of fair notice, it might choose to apply its interpretation 
prospectively if it would otherwise be punishing lawyers who could not
fairly anticipate what direction the court would take.57  But that was not
a problem in Kellogg-Martin, where the court adopted a narrow view of 
the prosecutorial disclosure rule. 
This might lead one to ask which body better apprehended the nature 
of the prosecutorial disclosure rule.  The next two parts of this essay
explore that question and reach an unexpected conclusion: although the 
ABA ethics committee and the Ohio Supreme Court had opposite visions of
equivalent rules, they may both be right.  Even so, there is something 
obviously jarring about the divide, which reveals deficiencies in the rule 
adoption process.  The ABA has an interest in persuading courts to adopt 
not only its Model Rules but also its interpretations of those rules, so the 
result seems to reflect a failure on its part.  The state court has an interest
in having ethics rules say what they mean so that lawyers in the state do
not have to worry whether the court ascribes meanings to ethics rules
that contradict the rules’ wording.  Moreover, it is confusing for lawyers 
when ethics opinions say one thing and court opinions say another.  The 
last part of this Article identifies some of the implications of this 
situation for rulemakers and courts in drafting and adopting professional
conduct rules. 
III. THE ABA’S VISION OF ABA MODEL RULE 3.8(D) 
Professor Zacharias’s article on integrity ethics distinguished rules of 
role from two different types of integrity rules—those that codified 
ordinary morality and those that incorporated or codified external law.58 
Rule drafters might plausibly draft a rule governing prosecutorial 
disclosure that fits into any of these three categories.  The ABA opinion 
obviously did not employ Professor Zacharias’s terminology or refer to 
his concept of the different functions that ethics rules serve.  But the 
opinion certainly takes an implicit stance on the nature of rule 3.8(d) and
56. See Green, Ethical Rules, supra note 54, at 557–58. 
57. See Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation, supra note 2, at 117 
& n.107 (citing In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Haley, 126 P.3d 1262, 1271–72 
(Wash. 2006)). 























its predecessor, DR 7-103(B).  It rejects the idea that rule 3.8(d) codifies
disclosure law generally or the Brady case’s materiality limitation in 
particular.  It expresses the view that the rule explicates prosecutors’ role 
in the adversary process and that the rule’s independent disclosure 
obligation derives from that role.  As discussed below, the committee’s
view of the rule was predictable and probably correct given the committee’s 
task, but it is not inevitable that a rule on prosecutorial disclosure would 
be conceived of as a rule of role, rather than an integrity rule.
A.  Prosecutorial Disclosure as an Expression of       
Common Morality 
Conventional moral principles might place limits on prosecutors’ 
zealousness as advocates, and integrity rules might codify such principles. 
Professor Zacharias identified rules requiring honesty of all lawyers,
including prosecutors, as an example.59  Leaving aside expectations of 
candor and integrity flowing from the lawyer’s role as a fiduciary of clients
and an officer of the court, an ethics code might forbid prosecutors and 
other trial lawyers from lying, and subject them to sanction for doing so, 
as an ordinary moral constraint on their impulse to do whatever is 
necessary to win cases for their chosen clients or causes.
The ordinary societal expectation of honesty has implications for 
whether prosecutors keep significant evidence or information under
wraps or disclose it to the defense.  It would be deceptive for a prosecutor to
present an appearance, whether to a jury or to the defense, that there is a
strong case for the defendant’s guilt, when the prosecutor knows or
believes that the defendant is innocent based on evidence unknown to
the defense and jury.  One might equally criticize a prosecutor who secretly 
possesses exculpatory evidence that casts the case in a significantly
different light, even if the prosecutor does not personally regard the evidence
as persuasive or credible.  In that event, the deception is not about the
prosecutor’s state of mind so much as about the objective state of the 
evidence.  Maintaining that the defendant is guilty seems deceptive when
the prosecutor secretly possesses—or, one might say, hides, buries, 
conceals, or suppresses—evidence that might establish a defendant’s
innocence.  The prosecutor’s position falsely implies that the prosecutor 
is personally unaware of any significant contrary evidence that has not 
been made available. 
Other moral principles may also be relevant.  For example, it may be
argued that people should not inflict undeserved harm on others.  When 
a prosecutor seeks a conviction against someone known to be innocent,
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the conduct most clearly offends this principle.  The same may be true 
when the prosecutor does not know the defendant is innocent but knows 
evidence that strongly suggests that the defendant is innocent.
Rule drafters may or may not believe these ordinary moral principles 
should limit lawyers’ conduct as advocates.  Certainly, when it comes to
criminal defense lawyers, the prevailing view is that, to some extent, the 
adversary ethic trumps the duty of honesty.  Criminal defense lawyers
conventionally make arguments to the jury in support of an acquittal that 
they personally disbelieve based on undisclosed conversations with the
client or others.60  To some degree, the deceptiveness of this practice is
tempered by the public’s conventional awareness that criminal defense 
lawyers do not always believe what they say and by instructions that jury
summations are arguments, not statements of personal belief.  However, 
the rationale for allowing criminal defense lawyers to engage in deception 
by taking a position that is contradicted by undisclosed evidence and
information would not apply with equal force, if at all, to prosecutors. 
Rule drafters might want to remind prosecutors that the ordinary moral
expectations still apply to them, if not to the other side. 
The earliest precursor to rule 3.8(d) might have been characterized as 
an integrity rule founded on ordinary morality.  The 1908 ABA Canons
of Professional Ethics recognized “the prosecutor’s . . . obligation not to 
suppress facts capable of establishing the innocence of the accused.”61 
One might argue that it is morally repugnant for anyone, lawyer or not,
to suppress facts that would exonerate an innocent person, unless 
secrecy was justified by something particular about the individual’s role,
for example, as close family member or as someone who learned the
information in a privileged relationship.  The canon might only have 
been a reminder to prosecutors that their advocacy role does not justify a 
departure from the ordinary principle.  The drafters of the Model Code
60. See John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A 
Response to Professor Subin’s Position on the Criminal Lawyer’s “Different Mission,” 1 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339, 345 (1987); Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer’s 
“Different Mission”: Reflections on the “Right” To Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 125, 126 (1987); see also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256–59 
(1967) (White, J., concurring) (“But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to
ascertain or present the truth.”).
61. ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 3 & n.11 (citing CANONS OF PROF’L 
ETHICS CANON 5 (1908) (“The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is 
not to convict, but to see that justice is done.  The suppression of facts or the secreting of

















     













almost certainly had this provision in mind because their task was to
improve upon the Canons.  Arguably, the drafters of DR 7-103(B) were 
simply improving on the canon while trying to effectuate a similar purpose.
But however one views the moral principle at stake, it becomes less
apt as a prosecutor moves away from concealing significant exculpatory 
evidence to withholding evidence that is merely helpful or favorable to
the defense.  For example, information may not establish that the defendant
is innocent in fact but simply that there is a reasonable doubt about the 
defendant’s guilt.  In that event, the evidence is material under Brady, 
but withholding it may not violate everyday moral principles
against dishonesty or inflicting undeserved harm because the defendant
may still be guilty in fact.  Common morality may not pose much 
restraint on a prosecutor who plays by existing laws and procedural rules
that distinguish between material exculpatory information that must be
produced and immaterial information that may be withheld, at least if the 
prosecutor does not falsely pretend to be more generous than the law
requires. 
Rule 3.8(d) demands even more than Brady in significant respects and 
therefore is even less easily explained as a special application of an
everyday moral principle.  The rule requires disclosure of any evidence
that would tend to establish the innocence of the accused.  Suppose the
prosecutor is personally convinced of the defendant’s guilt and has 
sufficiently strong evidence to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, even taking undisclosed evidence into account. 
Withholding favorable evidence or information, as the law permits, 
might undermine public confidence in the fairness of the process, but it
cannot easily be regarded as immoral.
As Professor Zacharias and I suggested in Reconceptualizing Advocacy
Ethics, ethics rules governing lawyers’ conduct as advocates are more
likely to codify professional morality than common societal morality.62 
That article drew on the 1845 decision in Rush v. Cavenaugh, in which
Chief Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that a 
lawyer prosecuting a criminal case for a private client had a duty as a
matter of “professional conscience” to dismiss the case if he came to
believe the defendant was innocent.63 We did not read the opinion as
drawing on common societal morality or giving deference to the
lawyer’s personal sense of morality but instead argued that the court was 
recognizing a “duty to refrain from seeking unjust convictions” that was 
an “aspect[] of lawyers’ duty to the court” and that was “implicit in 
62. See Zacharias & Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, supra note 2, at 4, 
37. 
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lawyers’ professional role.”64  Further, we saw the opinion as a precursor 
to the later ethics codes, whose provisions on advocacy ethics were not 
invariably acts of legislation but were in some cases articulations of 
“preexisting professional duties implicit in the lawyer’s role.”65 
One can make a plausible argument that there is an honesty principle 
at the core of the prosecutorial disclosure rule, just as there is at the core
of Brady, which built upon earlier decisions condemning prosecutors’ 
misrepresentations.66  But it would be hard to characterize the rule as 
nothing more than a codification of conventional morality.  The rule is 
not written that way.  It makes no express reference to honesty or other 
moral principles, it is not drafted at the level of generality that one 
associates with ordinary moral principles, and it makes demands well in
excess of those suggested by ordinary moral expectations. 
B.  Prosecutorial Disclosure as a Codification of External Law 
Alternatively, one might envision the prosecutor’s ethical disclosure 
duty exclusively as a matter of integrity ethics in the sense that the law-
abiding prosecutor must comply with the applicable law, period.  In that 
event, one might draft a disclosure rule as an integrity rule that either 
expressly incorporated external law or codified it. 
Code drafters might adopt a prosecutorial disclosure rule that merely 
recapitulates or reinforces external law for a host of reasons.  First, they 
may have substantive reasons to do so.  In particular, they may believe
that the existing law already demands as much or more disclosure from 
prosecutors than necessary to ensure the fair workings of the adversary
process.  They may also have procedural reasons.  The drafters may
doubt their competence to draft the ideal disclosure standards because 
they lack adequate experience in the criminal justice field or adequate
time to collect the information needed to develop a good rule, given the 
complexities of the criminal process.  They may equally doubt the 
competence or disinterestedness of the bar association that drafted the
model offered for the court’s consideration.  Rulemakers may also have 
concerns rooted in the nature of ethics codes and code drafting.  For
64. Zacharias & Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, supra note 2, at 37. 
65. Id. 
66. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (“The prosecution’s 
affirmative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant can trace its origins to





























example, the optimal rule may be extremely lengthy and complicated,
ultimately looking less like an “ethics” rule than a rule of criminal procedure. 
In general—but not invariably—code drafters have preferred rules that 
are relatively short and uncomplicated in order to preserve the appearance 
that the rules are about “ethics” and not just regulation.67 
Although the ABA opinion dispatched the possibility that, for one
reason or another, rule 3.8(d) was bounded by the external law, there 
were contrary arguments to be made.  It is true that rule 3.8(d) does not 
expressly refer to external law, in contrast to rules forbidding “unlawfully” 
interfering with the opposing party’s access to evidence or offering
witnesses inducements “prohibited by law.”68  And it is also true, as the
dissenting justice in Kellogg-Martin noted, that the rule makes no 
reference to materiality, a key limitation in the Brady line of cases.69 
But as Professor Zacharias observed, an integrity rule might essentially
paraphrase external law without intending to go significantly beyond it.70 
The drafters may have meant to do just that. 
The drafting history supports this possibility.  As the ABA opinion 
acknowledges, “[t]he ABA adopted the rule against the background of 
the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland.”71  Over time,
the Supreme Court would build on its Brady decision, making the materiality 
requirement an increasingly significant limitation on the scope of prosecutors’ 
constitutional obligations.72  The drafters of DR 7-103(B) may have regarded
their rule as a pretty fair paraphrase of the Brady obligation. 
67. Cf. Stern v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 20 (1st
Cir. 2000) (“[The Massachusetts rule based on ABA Model Rule 3.8(e) restricting
prosecutors from subpoenaing lawyers for information about their clients,] though
doubtless motivated by ethical concerns, has outgrown those humble beginnings. . . .  As 
written, [the rule] is more than an ethical standard.  It adds a novel procedural step—the
opportunity for a pre-service adversarial hearing—and to compound the matter, ordains 
that the hearing be conducted with new substantive standards in mind.”). 
68. See ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 4 & n.15 (citing MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a)–(b) (2010)). 
69. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 124 Ohio St. 3d 415, 2010-Ohio-
282, 923 N.E.2d 125, at ¶ 60 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (“The plain language of DR 7-
103(B) requires disclosure of the reports in this case because the reports are evidence 
‘that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce
the punishment.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-103 (1970), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules 
/professional/professional.pdf, superseded by OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 
(2007), available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/ 
ProfConductRules. pdf)). 
70. Zacharias, supra note 18, at 559–60. 
71. ABA Opinion 09-454, supra note 3, at 3. 
72. When the Supreme Court decided Brady in 1963, it was not a foregone 
conclusion that assessing whether favorable information was material would eventually
call for an after-the-fact evaluation of the information, in the light of all the trial
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This possibility is reinforced by the fact that DR 7-103(A), the other 
original provision of the special rule for prosecutors, was certainly
bounded by external law.  DR 7-103(A),73 which was carried over into 
Model Rule 3.8(a),74 proscribed a prosecutor’s institution of criminal 
charges when the prosecutor knows or it is obvious that there is no 
“probable cause.”75  The rule certainly went no further than external law 
requiring probable cause as a precondition of a prosecutor’s charging 
decision.  In fact, it allowed prosecutors leeway to charge in close cases
because it allowed for discipline only when the prosecutor knew, or it 
was obvious, that probable cause was lacking.  It is plausible that both 
provisions were meant to subject prosecutors to discipline for knowingly
violating existing legal obligations but that the drafters either misunderstood 
the disclosure law at the time or, as is more likely, misapprehended the
direction the law would take. Over the next decades, as the constitutional 
obligation was narrowed, the ethics rule increasingly diverged from it
because the drafters made no allowances for changes in the law. 
This account is inconsistent with the purpose of the rule, if one 
assumes the purpose is to do more than to remind prosecutors to abide
by their legal obligations and allow non-law-abiding prosecutors to be 
punished.  Certainly, broader purposes are both conceivable and
laudatory.  The ABA opinion implies that the rule is meant, at minimum,
to require prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure, as the Supreme
Court has urged them to do when dealing with potential Brady 
material.76  The result would be to reduce litigation, constitutional error, 
Rather, the understanding of materiality changed over time.  See United States v. Coppa,
267 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing progression in idea of materiality).  Indeed, 
to some extent, it remains contested, as some judges take the view that
materiality is essentially an appellate standard and that prosecutors are constitutionally
required to disclose favorable information regardless of whether it might later be deemed
immaterial.  See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005). 
73. DR 7-103(A) of the ABA Model Code provided: “A public prosecutor or other 
government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he 
knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.” MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (1980). 
74. Rule 3.8(a) of the ABA Model Rules provides: “The prosecutor in a criminal 
case shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2010).  It 
does not preserve the possibility of discipline where the absence of probable cause is 
“obvious” but not known to the prosecutor. 
75. See supra notes 73–74. 


























and the number of retrials.77  Moreover, the ABA’s ethics committee 
ascribed a broader purpose to the rule, namely, to make the criminal
process fairer and more accurate.  In its view, as previously noted, the 
rule “promotes the proper functioning of the adversarial process, thereby
reducing the risk of false convictions.”78  In identifying these broad 
purposes, however, the committee was drawing an inference from the 
language of the rule and other evidence, not relying on direct evidence of
the drafters’ conception.  As Professor Zacharias’s work demonstrates, it
would have been perfectly plausible for the ABA drafters to have had 
the more limited ambition merely to attempt to codify existing legal
obligations. 
C.  Prosecutorial Disclosure as an Expression of Role Morality 
Finally, one might think about prosecutorial disclosure as a requirement 
that grows out of the prosecutor’s role in criminal adjudications in order 
to fulfill the prosecutor’s function of assuring fair processes and fair 
outcomes.  This is, in effect, how the Supreme Court envisions prosecutorial 
disclosure as a constitutional matter.  The Brady line of cases is less
about honesty than about the preservation of minimally fair process.  In 
effect, constitutional case law identifies the minimal amount of information 
that prosecutors must share to guarantee the minimally necessary adversary 
testing of the prosecution’s proof. 
Similarly, criminal procedure rules and statutes on prosecutorial 
disclosure are essentially rules of role.  They go beyond the constitutional 
minimum because they are not ordinarily codifications of a legislature’s 
vision of a minimally fair process.  Ideally, they reflect something closer
to lawmakers’ view, as a matter of public policy, of how best to promote 
77. The dissenting justice in Kellogg-Martin put it slightly differently when he 
noted that the propriety of the lawyer’s conduct for ethics purposes should not turn on
whether, by happenstance, otherwise proscribed conduct turns out to be harmless.  See
Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 124 Ohio St. 3d 415, 2010-Ohio-282, 923 
N.E.2d 125, at ¶ 74 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting) (“The professional conduct of an attorney
should not be based upon the quantum of evidence produced at a criminal trial, or 
whether a defendant pleads guilty, regardless of the attorney’s conduct.  Rather, the 
conduct of an attorney should be evaluated on the basis of her own actions.”). That is, 
the rule is meant to allow for punishment of prosecutors whose conduct was professionally
wrongful as viewed ex ante, even if not unconstitutional in hindsight.  For example, in
Muhammad v. Kelly, 575 F.3d 359, 370 (4th Cir. 2009), the prosecution was found to 
have withheld favorable evidence but not to have violated the Constitution because the
evidence was not material or was cumulative of other evidence the defense possessed. 
The court found that the prosecution’s conduct was “not admirable,” and said that it “by
no means condone[s] the [prosecution’s] actions.”  Id. Rule 3.8(d) might be understood, 
in part, as allowing for personal sanctions in cases such as this, on the theory that the 
prosecutor’s conduct, though not unconstitutional, was professionally improper.
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fairness while also taking other relevant interests into account.  On one
side of the scale are fair process considerations favoring broad disclosure. 
These include the public interest in ensuring that criminal defendants 
make well-advised decisions regarding their trial rights and that their 
lawyers present a skilled defense.  Disclosure assists criminal defense 
lawyers to fulfill their ethical obligations to give clients competent advice
and advocacy.79 But there are countervailing interests in preventing 
obstructions of justice or witness tampering that may sometimes occur
when disclosures are too extensive or are made too soon, in limiting the 
administrative and financial costs of disclosure, and in limiting the cost
of judicial proceedings that would result from prosecutors’ noncompliance
with the rule. 
Professional ethics may impose disclosure obligations on prosecutors 
that are independent of the Constitution, rules, and statutes, if one assumes
that the prosecutorial role implies or justifies disclosure obligations that
are not fully elaborated by the existing law.  Suppose that Brady had not 
yet been decided and that criminal procedure laws on prosecutorial
disclosure laws had not yet been adopted.  It might be argued that as an
ethical matter, prosecutors as ministers of justice must make at least
some disclosure to ensure that defendants received fair trials and the 
outcomes of those trials were reliable.  Rules of ethics might be drafted
to codify that obligation.  Pursuant to their supervisory authority to regulate 
lawyers, courts might have power to adopt and enforce these rules. 
Alternatively, courts’ supervisory authority might provide a legal basis 
for adopting ethics rules for prosecutors reflecting how courts, as a
matter of public policy, would strike the right balance between the competing
interests at stake with regard to prosecutorial disclosure. 
In either case, if the court were writing on a blank slate, its ethics rule
might not look like a codification of Brady because the court would not 
be explicating the Due Process Clause and establishing a constitutional 
floor.  Its rule also might differ from current statutes or procedural rules 
addressing this subject.  One reason is that the court might see things 
differently from the legislature.  Another is that the ethics rule would 
serve a somewhat different function from a procedural rule.  Although 
trial judges might compel prosecutors to comply with an ethics rule,
















   
  
 
violations of the ethics rule itself would not have a potential legal 
remedy in the criminal litigation.80 
Although external law is not in fact silent on the question of what 
prosecutors should disclose to the defense, it is also not necessarily
preemptive.  Certainly, as a matter of professional discretion, prosecutors 
can disclose more than the law requires, and many do.  Some are only 
slightly more generous than the law demands, and others, such as those 
with an “open file” policy in jurisdictions where the law does not require 
it, are substantially more generous.81  As the ABA opinion recognized, 
constitutional decisions do not bar courts from adopting professional 
conduct rules on the same subject.  Ordinarily, statutes do not bar such
rules either.  It may be preferable to impose more demanding disclosure 
obligations on prosecutors as a matter of professional obligation rather
than leaving it to prosecutors’ discretion whether to be more forthcoming 
than the Constitution and statutes require. 
One could have easily predicted—as Professor Zacharias did—that the 
ABA ethics committee would implicitly view rule 3.8(d) as a rule of role 
that was independent from external law rather than as an integrity rule 
that tracked, or was bounded by, external law.  To conclude otherwise 
would be to ignore the rule’s language in several respects.  First, the rule 
contained no explicit materiality limitation.  Second, the language 
describing what had to be disclosed—“all evidence or information . . . 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense”82— 
is too broad to be interpreted to contain an implicit materiality limitation, 
especially as materiality is interpreted in the Supreme Court decisions.
Third, as the ethics opinion noted, there is already a rule subjecting
prosecutors and other lawyers to discipline for flouting discovery rules.83 
If the drafters meant to draft a somewhat redundant law requiring 
prosecutors in particular to comply with discovery obligations, they
might have been expected to do so explicitly.  Beyond that, a rule of 
professional conduct incorporating an after-the-fact materiality test is 
antithetical to the rules’ usual approach, which is to focus on lawyers’ 
conduct, not the effect of their conduct; in general, “no harm, no foul” is 
not a recognized ethics principle. 
80. On the other hand, an ethics rule would presumably leave a fair amount to 
prosecutors’ office policies and individual discretion.  Otherwise, risk-averse prosecutors, to
avoid violating the rule, might disclose more than they arguably should.  In other words,
the ethical floor might be higher than the constitutional floor, but it would still not be the 
ideal.
81. See Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: 
Report of the Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1968 
(2010). 
82. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 3.8(d) (2010). 





























[VOL. 48:  57, 2011] Prosecutors’ Ethical Duty of Disclosure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Against this background, it is hard to imagine the ABA ethics committee
concluding that rule 3.8(d) was bounded by external law without a 
compelling basis in the text or drafting history for this view.  To do so
would diminish the credibility of the Model Rules by suggesting that
they are poorly drafted—they do not mean what they say.  It would also 
undermine the credibility of leading authorities on the ethics rules who
uniformly assumed that the rule went beyond the external law.84  And 
doing so would trivialize a rule addressing an aspect of professional
conduct that was significant and increasingly controversial. Although the 
bar’s claim to be “self-regulating” is overstated—if not, as Professor
Zacharias once wrote, mythic85—the bar seeks to wield influence.86 
Conceptualizing rule 3.8(d) as a restatement of other law forty years
after its adoption might undermine the ABA’s authority to influence 
courts and speak for the profession through its ethics rules.  On the other 
hand, interpreting rule 3.8(d) to mean what it says would promote the 
ABA’s interest in preserving its influence, both in actuality and in 
appearance, at least if courts later accepted the committee’s view. 
As a rule of role for lawyers serving as prosecutors, rule 3.8(d) might 
be viewed in either of two ways—as either an articulation or an
elaboration of prosecutors’ duties.87  Courts’ propensity to adopt the rule 
or to accept the ABA’s interpretation of it might turn in part on which 
characterization one adopted.  If the rule appeared to codify a generally
prevailing understanding of what a lawyer’s role implied, then the rule 
should not be controversial.  It would serve a pedagogic function and
facilitate discipline for departures from accepted norms, but it would not 
make new or contestable demands on lawyers.  A quasi-legislative rule,
however, would merit closer scrutiny by a court, which might take a 
different view from rule drafters about what new obligations lawyers 
should undertake. 
Other provisions of rule 3.8 illustrate the distinction.  On one hand, 
rule 3.8(g), which requires prosecutors to disclose and investigate “new,
84. See supra note 12. 
85. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 
1153 (2009) (“Conceiving of the disciplinary codes as mere professional self-regulation
rather than as one element of an expansive regulatory regime governing the bar misleads
courts, code drafters, lawyers, and laypersons alike.”).
86. See id. at 1150 (“[B]ecause lawyers participate heavily in producing the
governing professional rules and the broader external law that affects the bar, lawyers in
some respects are distinct among regulated professionals.”).







    
 
 
     
 
     
 
   
 
  




   
 
  
   
credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a 
convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant 
was convicted,”88 has fairly been characterized as a codification of what 
good prosecuting necessarily entails.89  Indeed, it has been said to be less
demanding than prevailing professional expectations.90  Although 
prosecutors may disagree about whether the norms should be incorporated
into disciplinary rules,91 virtually none have argued that prosecutors as
ministers of justice may properly ignore or suppress significant
exculpatory evidence that comes their way after obtaining a conviction. 
On the other hand, rule 3.8(e), which regulates prosecutors’ issuance of 
subpoenas to lawyers for evidence about their clients, was an innovation 
88. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) (2010). 
89. See AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, 105B: REPORT TO THE HOUSE 
OF DELEGATES 3 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/topics/Plenary5/
Workshops/Workshop5C/B_Scheck-AmericanBarAssoc105B.pdf.  The Report to the House
of Delegates noted: 
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Imbler v. Pachtman that
prosecutors are “bound by the ethics of [their] office to inform the appropriate 
authority of after-acquired or other information that cases doubt upon the 
correctness of the conviction.”  Further, when a prosecutor concludes upon 
investigation of such evidence that an innocent person was convicted, it is well 
recognized that the prosecutor has an obligation to endeavor to rectify the 
injustice. These obligations have not, however, been codified in Rule 3.8 of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which identifies the “Special 
Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.”  Proposed Rules 3.8(g) and (h), and the 
accompanying Comments would rectify this omission. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.15 (1976)). 
90. Id. at 5 (“The Rule and Comments are designed to provide clear guidance to
prosecutors concerning their minimum disciplinary responsibilities, with the expectation 
that, as ministers of justice, prosecutors routinely will and should go beyond the 
disciplinary minimum.” (footnote omitted)); see also Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 467, 481–82 (2009) (“These provisions are meant to establish the disciplinary
minimum, not to fully elaborate the professional expectations for prosecutors.”); see 
generally Niki Kuckes, The State of Rule 3.8: Prosecutorial Ethics Reform Since Ethics 
2000, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427 (2009) (discussing the various attempts that have
been made to change rule 3.8 since the Ethics 2000 Commission). 
91. Prosecutors in different jurisdictions have divided over whether states should 
adopt the ABA models.  State prosecutors’ organizations have petitioned the judiciary to 
adopt the rule in Wisconsin, see Petition at 1, In re Amendment of Supreme Court Rules
Chapter 20, Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (No. 08-24) (Wis. Sept. 19, 
2008), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/supreme/docs/0824petition.pdf, where it 
was subsequently adopted, see Order at 1–2, In re Amendment of Supreme Court Rules 
Chapter 20, Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (No. 08-24) (Wis. June 17, 
2009), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/rulhear/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf
&seqNo=36849, and Tennessee, where it was also adopted, see Order at 1, 130–31, In re 
Petition for the Adoption of Amended Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct (No. 
M2009-00979-SC-RL1-RL) (Tenn. Sept. 29, 2010), available at http://www.tba.org/ethics/
TSC_Order_Adopting_TRPC.pdf, but have opposed the rules in Washington, Letter 
from Thomas A. McBride, Exec. Sec’y, Wash. Ass’n of Prosecuting Attorneys, to Arthur 
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adopted by the ABA in response to perceived overreaching by prosecutors. 
Federal prosecutors argued variously that the restrictions were unwise on
policy grounds, interfered with grand juries’ autonomy, overstepped
judicial authority, and were unnecessary in light of prosecutorial self-
restraint.92  Few state courts were persuaded to adopt the model rule, and
one federal court rejected its characterization as entirely an “ethics”
rule.93 
Not surprisingly, the rule drafters seemed to suggest that the prosecutorial 
disclosure rule merely articulated an obligation implicit in prosecutors’ 
duty to do justice.  Contemporaneous with drafting DR 7-103(B), the 
ABA Model Code drafters adopted accompanying “Ethical Considerations” 
that served in part as interpretive guides, much like the comments now 
accompanying the rules in the ABA Model Rules.  The relevant ethical 
consideration indicates that the provisions of the prosecutorial ethics rule 
were expressions of a special role that “differs from that of the usual
advocate,” that is, a “duty . . . to seek justice, not merely to convict.”94 
The comments to rule 3.8 preserve this understanding.95 
Rule 3.8(d) is more fairly viewed, however, as the product of a quasi-
legislative determination, first by the ABA in drafting it and then by the
courts in adopting it.  It may have been widely understood before the 
adoption of DR 7-103(B) that prosecutors should not suppress highly 
exculpatory evidence such as by hiding or intimidating defense witnesses. 
However, no one has identified a conventional understanding prior to the 
rule’s adoption that prosecutors must disclose all information favorable 
to the defense; further, prosecutors have reasonable, if not compelling, 
arguments to the contrary. 
In sum, it seems reasonable for the ABA’s ethics committee to take 
the view that the ABA model rule does not merely remind prosecutors to 
obey constitutional law but improves the criminal justice process by
augmenting prosecutors’ disclosure duty under constitutional case law.
92. For discussions of rule 3.8(e) and its drafting history, see Roger C. Cramton & 
Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal Prosecutors: The Controversies over the 
Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 291 (1992); Fred C. Zacharias, A 
Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 
917 (1992); and Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal 
Prosecutors, or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 429, 458–61 (1996). 
93. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
94. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980). 
95. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010). 
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As so understood, the rule does not codify a conventional understanding 
of prosecutorial obligations but rather embodies a policy judgment that 
is contestable.  Rule 3.8(d), in other words, is just the sort of rule that
merits the closest scrutiny from state courts when they set out to adopt 
and interpret legally effective ethics rules against the background of the 
ABA Model Rules and ethics opinions. 
IV. THE OHIO SUPREME COURT’S VISION OF OHIO’S 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE RULE 
The Ohio Supreme Court might reasonably have viewed its
prosecutorial disclosure rule as an integrity rule that goes no further than 
external law for reasons that probably would not have been considered 
by, or been important to, the ABA ethics committee.  Although the Ohio 
rule was worded similarly to the ABA model interpreted by the ABA 
ethics committee, the Ohio Supreme Court was engaged in a different
task.  The ABA ethics committee essentially looked at the ABA rule in 
the abstract.  The Ohio Supreme Court, however, was reviewing a state
ethics rule that was adopted in a particular manner and that existed in the 
context of a particular body of state law dealing with the same subject 
matter.  Unlike the ABA ethics opinion, the court’s decision would have 
legal effect.  The court might therefore consider the extent of its
particular authority to regulate prosecutors through the application of 
ethics rules and the legitimacy and wisdom of exercising that authority
in its state, given the court’s relationship with the other government 
branches.  Also unlike the ABA ethics committee, the court was interpreting
the rule in the context of its particular state’s disciplinary process.
All of these differences had potential significance. 
First, and perhaps most significantly, a state court might read its 
prosecutorial disclosure rule narrowly because of procedural concerns
about the manner in which it was drafted and adopted.  Suppose that a 
court sought to adopt the optimal prosecutorial disclosure rule—one that 
best promoted a fair trial while giving due respect to competing interests.  
Presumably, given the importance and difficulty of striking the right 
balance, the ideal judicial rulemaking process would be similar to
administrative rulemaking or legislating.  The court might gather the 
views of criminal defense lawyers, prosecutors, and trial judges—but not 
legal ethicists particularly—put a proposed rule out for public comment, 
and take account of different, knowledgeable perspectives.96  The ideal 
96. See generally Bruce A. Green, Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should 
Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be Created?, 64 GEO. 
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rule for one state would not necessarily be the same as the ideal rule for 
another state. 
DR 7-103(B) and rule 3.8(d) were the product of processes that would 
not inspire confidence that the ABA got it right.  No one knows what the 
drafters of DR 7-103(B) were thinking forty years ago when they
adopted the rule, and there is nothing to suggest that ABA model rule 
drafters gave the rule much thought when they carried it over into rule 
3.8(d).  Certainly, there is no evidence that they reconsidered and ratified 
it in light of whatever intervening changes may have occurred in the law
and criminal process.  More recently, when the ABA’s “Ethics 2000” 
Commission comprehensively reviewed the Model Rules and proposed 
amendments, the evidence is that they left rule 3.8 alone, not because
they were satisfied that it was ideal, but for political reasons and out of 
concerns about their own limitations.97  Further, even if these rules made
sense for the average state, they may not be best for any particular state,
given its particular criminal laws, processes, traditions, and institutions. 
Unarticulated process considerations may well have influenced the 
court’s decision in Kellogg-Martin.  The process by which the court 
initially adopted DR 7-103(B) would have called the rule into question if 
the rule were intended to demand significantly more than other laws. 
Before adopting the rule, the Ohio Supreme Court did not give notice to
the bar that the rule may demand more than the external law and did not 
seek input from different segments of the bench and bar about the 
advisability of the rule as so interpreted.  Perhaps had it undertaken such 
a process, the court would ultimately have concluded that the rule, as 
interpreted by the ABA, struck just the right balance.  During the course 
of more than a year between when Kellogg-Martin was submitted to the 
Ohio Supreme Court and when that court decided the case, a comparable 
process was underway and almost completed.  As the dissenting judge 
noted, the court had recently proposed changing to the relevant state rule
of criminal procedure to provide for more open discovery with the stated 
purpose of “provid[ing] for a just determination of criminal proceedings 
and to secure the fair, impartial, and speedy administration of justice.”98 
The court’s recommended revisions to the criminal procedure rule suggest
that the court might well have been sympathetic to a demanding rule of 
97. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573. 
98. Disciplinary Counsel v. Kellogg-Martin, 124 Ohio St. 3d 415, 2010-Ohio-282,



















   
 
role.  But that was not a foregone conclusion.  Neither the ABA nor 
Ohio institutions had undertaken a robust process to ensure that an ethics 
rule requiring prosecutors to disclose all favorable evidence was the best
rule either for states in general or for Ohio in particular. 
Second, unlike the ABA, a state court may be concerned about the 
extent to which it could or should regulate prosecutors’ disclosure duties 
through the exercise of supervisory authority over the legal profession.
In 2002 and 2003, in a pair of articles in the Vanderbilt Law Review, 
Professor Zacharias and I explored federal courts’ authority to regulate
lawyers in general and prosecutors in particular.99  The articles noted 
questions about the legitimacy and wisdom of employing judicial
supervisory power to regulate prosecutors particularly with respect to 
areas of conduct that were extensively regulated already by other law.
One could raise similar questions for state courts, which might well be 
answered differently from state to state.
A state court that viewed its own authority conservatively might doubt 
the wisdom or legitimacy of adopting disclosure rules for prosecutors 
that were more demanding than statutory obligations.  It might worry
that its supervisory authority to establish ethics rules is too limited to 
justify such a rule, that an ethics rule would interfere with legislative 
authority to adopt procedural rules, or that an ethics rule would interfere 
with executive branch authority.  Or the court might worry that other 
government bodies or the public would perceive it to be overstepping, 
even if it were acting within lawful authority, and that its relationship
with other bodies or public respect would be eroded as a result. 
Even if a court were satisfied that its legal authority to regulate 
prosecutors through the adoption and enforcement of ethics rules was 
established and well accepted, it might be reluctant to wield that power, 
preferring to leave prosecutorial regulation almost exclusively to other 
law.  Many lawyers and judges are uncomfortable with ethics codes,
viewing them as weaker or more ephemeral than other law or too easily
susceptible to illegitimate capture by the bar,100 or regarding the interpretation 
of ethics rules as more arbitrary and less rigorous than other legal
decisionmaking.101  Judges interpreting and applying constitutional cases 
or statutes can claim to be like umpires calling balls and strikes, whereas
99. See Green & Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, supra note 1; 
Zacharias & Green, Federal Court Authority To Regulate Lawyers, supra note 2; see
also Zacharias & Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, supra note 1, at 260. 
100. See Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation, supra note 2, at 92– 
97. 
101. Cf. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2575 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
























   
 
 
    
  
[VOL. 48:  57, 2011] Prosecutors’ Ethical Duty of Disclosure
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
adopting and applying ethics rules puts them at the center of the game,
making them more easily susceptible to criticism.102 
It would have made sense for the Ohio Supreme Court to weigh
concerns such as these, given its efforts to reform criminal discovery
practices through amendments to the state’s criminal procedure rules. 
Imposing broad discovery obligations by applying a somewhat obscure 
disciplinary rule just as these reform efforts were underway might have
been viewed as autocratic, undemocratic, or preemptive.  Prosecutors 
might have been offended that the court’s view of the ethics rule was 
one-sided and unduly demanding, and that the court’s interpretation did
not adequately take their concerns into account.  The legislature may 
have perceived that the court was usurping its authority over criminal 
procedure.  The court’s credibility as an honest broker between the 
state’s prosecutors and the defense bar may have been undermined.  The 
resulting mistrust might have jeopardized support for the proposed
procedural rules, which the court might have believed struck a better and 
fairer balance than the prosecutorial disclosure rule as construed by the 
ABA.
Third, a court may be more sensitive than the ABA to problems
created by multiple law—constitutional cases, procedural rules, and
ethics rules—applying to a single area of prosecutorial conduct, and may
seek to harmonize the law by aligning ethics rules with external law.  In 
his writings, Professor Zacharias frequently raised concerns about the
multiple and inconsistent laws governing lawyers,103 and one of his
scholarly projects was to try to understand why different bodies of the 
law of lawyering diverged and to propose how courts and other law 
102. If, for example, constitutionally or statutorily required disclosures contributed 
to witness tampering or other evils, the blame might fall on the framers of the Due 
Process Clause, on the Supreme Court that interpreted it in the Brady line of cases, or on
the legislature. But if the relevant disclosures were required exclusively by an ethics 
rule, the blame would fall on the court that adopted the rule. Likewise, the adopting
court might be criticized simply in anticipation that a demanding ethics rule would lead 
to such evils.
103. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335, 
370 (1994) (noting problems for lawyers in national practices created by inconsistent 
state ethics rules); Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation, supra note 2, 
at 75 (“[T]here is something troubling about the ease with which courts come to different 
conclusions about the propriety of the same professional behavior, depending on the 
circumstance in which the issue is decided.”).
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makers might do a better job of bringing them into convergence.104 
Recognizing the likelihood that Ohio would soon reform its criminal 
discovery law in a manner enjoying broad support, the court may have
seen little to gain from an ethics rule that augmented the law, and may
have perceived that any benefit would be overshadowed by the complexities 
caused by an ethics rule establishing independent disclosure obligations. 
Finally, a court may have concerns about how a rule will be employed 
by its particular state’s disciplinary authority.  In a state in which
disciplinary authorities pursue lawyers overzealously based on aggressive 
readings of the disciplinary rules, courts may be inclined to protect
lawyers by construing ethics rules narrowly; conversely, courts that are 
confident that disciplinary agencies exercise discretion prudently may be
less inclined to do so.  The prevailing professional assumption is that 
disciplinary authorities tend to be underzealous when it comes to criminal 
prosecutors; further, both the comments to rule 3.8 and Opinion 09-454 
recognize the importance of cutting prosecutors some slack.105  Based on 
the case before it, however, the Ohio Supreme Court in Kellogg-Martin
may have had doubts about how its state’s disciplinary authorities 
exercised discretion.  It may have worried that a broadly construed rule 
would cause prosecutors to be excessively cautious, discourage lawyers
from becoming prosecutors, lead to intrusive disciplinary inquiries, or
cause similar harms.106 
The result is that, even though the ABA ethics committee reasonably 
envisioned Model Rule 3.8(d) as a rule of role that was independent of 
external law, the Ohio Supreme Court opinion reasonably envisioned its 
equivalent ethics rule as an integrity rule that was bounded by external law. 
104. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 69, 95 (1999) (“[I]it may be reasonable for legislatures to take a more 
active role in defining the interrelationship between privilege and confidentiality, to 
harmonize the definitions, and to minimize the overlap of separate doctrines.”); Zacharias
& Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation, supra note 2, at 90–92 (suggesting that in
exercising supervisory authority in litigation, in decisionmaking regarding common law 
and equitable claims against lawyers, and in attorney discipline, courts “addressing 
conduct covered by the [ethics] codes . . . should take the rules as the starting point in 
their analyses”).
 105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 9 (“A prosecutor’s independent 
judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger 
the obligations of sections (g) and (h), though subsequently determined to have been 
erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule.”), cited in ABA Opinion 09-454, 
supra note 3, at 6 n.26. 
106. See generally Zacharias & Green, The Duty To Avoid Wrongful Convictions, 
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V. CONCLUSION
The inconsistent visions of the ABA ethics committee and the Ohio 
Supreme Court are jarring.  Even if their approaches can be reconciled— 
even if, as this essay suggests, each may be right in its own way—the 
situation is scarcely ideal from either body’s perspective.  If the ABA
ethics committee is right, then states should regulate prosecutors by 
requiring them broadly to disclose information that is favorable to the 
defense.  The Ohio Supreme Court, for one, has decided otherwise.  The 
state court decision will likely be perceived as a tacit rejection of the 
ABA’s view on prosecutorial ethics.  Other state courts may follow suit. 
Of course, there is no shame in this.  ABA models are just models.
Courts occasionally decline to adopt ABA model rules of lawyer and
judicial ethics.  Sometimes the ABA knows that it is pushing courts further
than they are disposed to go.  Nothing about this raises general doubts 
about the legitimacy of the ABA’s role in lawyer regulation.  But the
situation suggests that the ABA was ineffective in promoting its view.
For its part, the state court adopted a rule with which it was unwilling
to live.  On its face, its rule placed significant demands on prosecutors, 
and the state disciplinary authorities so understood, but when it came 
time to enforce the rule as written, the state court balked.  The situation 
suggests that the state court was inattentive at the rule adoption stage and 
presents doubts about whether the court’s ethics rules as written are a 
reliable guide to the court’s expectations. 
The competing visions expressed by the ABA ethics opinion and the
Ohio Supreme Court underscore and exacerbate uncertainties about the 
character of other states’ prosecutorial disclosure rules.  Federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, have assumed that the state rules demand
more than the constitutional case law, and it may be that many state high 
courts would agree if they were to consider the question.  In the absence
of authoritative state court rulings, however, prosecutors may feel free to
ignore state counterparts to rule 3.8(d), and the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
decision may further embolden prosecutors.  Additionally, state trial judges 
who are ruling on discovery disputes and state disciplinary authorities 
may hesitate to enforce these rules.
This essay paying tribute to Fred Zacharias’s work and building on 
that work must naturally conclude by asking what lessons the ABA and
courts can learn from this.  That is undoubtedly the question with which 




























there are, indeed, lessons to offer both the ABA and courts regarding 
drafting and adopting ethics rules. 
The narrow point, as Fred recognized, is that state courts should now 
reexamine their prosecutorial disclosure rules to decide how they want 
the rules to function.  If a court wants its rule to be given the full effect
of the rule’s language, consistently with Opinion 09-454, it should put 
the bar on notice of that intention, so that prosecutors know that they
must make liberal disclosure, and trial judges and disciplinary authorities 
can call prosecutors to account when they knowingly fail to do so.  If a 
court wants the rule to be coextensive with Brady decisions, it should 
make that clear, preferably by rewriting the rule to bring its meaning in 
alignment with its function as an integrity rule.  Additionally, as Fred 
further recognized, there are broader points to be made about ethics 
rulemaking. 
There is little that the ABA could do about some of the concerns that 
may have influenced the Ohio Supreme Court, but it certainly could
have anticipated process concerns that the court may have had.  In a
sense, the prosecutorial disclosure rule was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. 
When state courts adopted it in the early 1970s as part of a package of 
new rules contained in the ABA Model Code, the ABA did not focus
state courts’ attention on the possibility that the rule would impose 
obligations that far exceeded prosecutors’ legal obligations, and state
courts did not focus prosecutors and others on this possibility and solicit
feedback.  Years later, when the court was called upon to apply the rule, 
it was understandably reluctant to adopt the ABA’s interpretation because
this was a questionable way to establish demanding disclosure obligations.
The ABA can improve its rulemaking process in several ways to make
its product more credible.  First, it can make its process more transparent
and more broadly inclusive of varying, relevant viewpoints, as in fact it 
has over the years.  Second, it can attempt to ensure that, substantively,
its rules adequately reflect legitimate viewpoints on multiple sides of an
issue.  This is particularly important when the drafting process is quasi-
legislative in the sense that drafters must strike a balance among competing
interests.  This may mean that the rules will reflect compromises rather
than going as far as some, or even a substantial majority, would like 
them to go in one particular direction.  Further, the ABA should put
courts on notice when a rule imposes obligations that exceed ordinary
moral or legal expectations, rather than waiting for future ethics opinions
to make this clear.107  In some cases, thinking about how to characterize 
107. For example, as noted earlier, the California State Bar is explicit that its 
proposed prosecutorial disclosure rule would go beyond the external law. See  STATE 
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the rule should lead the ABA to refrain from advancing its view of lawyer
conduct through an ethics rule at all but perhaps instead to propose 
legislation, a procedural rule change, or a change to standards or guidelines 
that are not meant to be legally enforceable. 
State courts, in turn can improve their rule adoption processes.  By all
appearances, the Ohio Supreme Court initially rubber-stamped a bar 
association model rule, never revisited the rule in the context of potential 
legal and institutional changes over time, and later paid a price for its 
inattention. State courts should be more engaged in adopting rules and
should periodically reexamine their rules, whether or not prompted to do
so by the ABA’s own revision and amendment processes.  If they lack
confidence in the model rule drafting process, they should establish a 
robust process for reviewing the ABA models and, where appropriate,
developing alternatives.  Whatever unarticulated concerns may have led
the Ohio Supreme Court to reject the plain meaning of its rule could
have been addressed sooner in a rule adoption or revision process.  At
that earlier stage, the court should have endorsed the rule in light of a 
fuller understanding of its import, refrained from adopting the rule, or 
written or rewritten it differently. 
These thoughts owe much to Fred Zacharias’s body of writing and to 
what I learned during our ten-year collaboration, as well as to the notes 
he sent in the spring of 2009.  I suspect, however, that he would have 
identified additional, and perhaps more profound or more interesting, 
implications.  That is the smallest part of the loss that his passing represents. 
I dedicate this essay to Fred’s memory and express my gratitude to the 
San Diego Law Review for this opportunity to pay tribute to an exceptional 
scholar and friend.
35, at 78–79 (“Proposed Rule 3.8 clarifies and, in some instances, expands the scope of a 
prosecutor’s duties under the Model Rule . . . .”).
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